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8  Bolivian Debt Management, 
1985-88 
We saw in the previous chapter that the cutoff in foreign lending to Bolivia in 
the  early  1980s,  combined  with  heavy  debt-service  payments  during 
1982-84,  was  a key  factor  in provoking  the  Bolivian  hyperinflation.  The 
commercial bank debt payments were unilaterally suspended in May 1984 by 
the  Siles  government  at  the  insistence  of  the  COB,  the  trade  union 
organization.  When  President  Paz  came to office,  the key  intention  with 
respect to the foreign debt was to avoid a resurgence of  inflation that could 
be caused by a return to heavy debt-service payments. 
The Paz  government  began  negotiations  with  its  various  creditors  on  a 
differentiated package of debt relief. With respect to the IMF and the World 
Bank, there  was  no prospect  of  debt relief  via  reschedulings,  since  those 
institutions do not reschedule their debts. Thus, the government attempted to 
arrange new credits that would offset the debt servicing, thereby leading to a 
net resource inflow from these institutions. With respect to the bilateral cred- 
itors,  the  intention  was  to  get  a fully  negotiated  postponement  of  interest 
and principal payments through a settlement in the Paris Club and to arrange 
for net new credits from friendly governments. 
Finally, with respect to the commercial creditors, the goal was essentially 
to get a new kind  of  settlement on the debt that would eliminate Bolivia’s 
debt  overhang  and  obviate  the  need  to makc cconomically  and  politically 
destabilizing  net  transfers  to  the bank  creditors.  In  the  event, Bolivia  has 
maintained a suspension of interest servicing to the bank creditors since 1985 
and  negotiated  a  novel  “debt  buyback,”  which  eliminated  approximately 
one-half of  Bolivia’s commercial bank debt by the end of  1988. 
In  this  chapter  we  analyze  both  the  conceptual  underpinnings  and  the 
nature of  negotiations  that led to the Bolivian buyback,  as well  as discuss 
briefly the nature of  Bolivia’s settlement with the other creditors. 
The chapter continues  in three  sections.  In the next  section,  we explain 
why  a comprehensive  debt reduction  mechanism,  such as a debt buyback, 
can be highly  desirable  for the  creditors  as well  as the  debtor.  Then,  we 
describe  the  negotiations  and  implementation  of the  Bolivian buyback  and 
argue that, indeed, the arrangement has been of benefit to the creditor banks 
as well as to Bolivia.  Finally, we briefly describe  the favorable debt relief 
that has been achieved by Bolivia in negotiations with its other creditors. 
8.1  The General Theory of Debt Reduction Operations 
If  a country owes $1  billion  on which  it can only pay  an expected  $50 
million, the country may suffer enormous costs from being unable to pay the 253  BolividChapter 8 
full amount due. It will face a great difficulty  in new borrowing,  even for 
highly productive investments.  It will face high bargaining costs in handling 
the  $1  billion  of  bad  debt.*  And,  it  will  face sanctions  from disgruntled 
creditors  (e.g.,  a  withdrawal  of  trade  credits)  that  will  hinder  its  future 
economic  perf~rmance.~  In  addition,  there  will  be  a  major  internal  dis- 
incentive to economic  reforms  which  increase  the  debt-service  capacity  of 
the country, since the costs of reform are borne by the country, while many 
of  the benefits of reform will be appropriated by the creditors (who receive 
higher repayments in the event of  ref~rm).~ 
For  these  reasons,  it  may  well  be  beneficial  for the country  to  pay  an 
amount even more than the $50 million (in present value terms), in order to 
cancel the overhang of $1 billion of mostly bad debt. It will also be generally 
advantageous  for the creditors  to accept  a partial payment  on the  debt, as 
long  as  it is in  excess  of  the $50 million  expected  payments.  The partial 
payments could come in the form of a direct cash buyback (especially if the 
country can borrow the funds for the buyback from friendly governments) or 
some other arrangement where future debt payments of over $50 million are 
guaranteed by the debtor country. A cash-starved country  would  obviously 
prefer  to find  ways  to make the  present  value  of  payments  in  the  future, 
rather  than  with  current  cash.5 By  eliminating  the  overhang, the  country 
would avoid the costs of default and regain the incentives for internal reform. 
In practice, even mutually advantageous debt reduction schemes (in which 
the debtor clears the debt overhang and the creditors raise the total value of 
payments  that  they  receive)  are  hard  to  negotiate  under  the  current  debt 
management  strategy  of  the IMF and the  creditor  governments.  There are 
several decisive reasons why even mutually beneficial  deals have not taken 
place. First, the few very heavily exposed banks have an inherent incentive 
to reject buyback deals, even when they are efficient from the point of view 
of  the  banks as a whole  (i.e., when they raise the market value of overall 
debt repayments).6 Second, the U.S. government is the main arbiter of the 
kind of deals that take place, and it has vetoed almost all comprehensive debt 
reduction  schemes, on behalf  of  the  most-heavily  exposed  money  center 
banks.  Third, for the smaller countries, the debt negotiations are guided by 
the creditors’ concerns over precedent for the large debtors,  rather than for 
the  efficiency  of  the  outcome for the  small  debtor.  It  is generally  best  to 
“strangle”  a  little  country,  even  at  the  expense  of  the  country’s  debt 
servicing,  if  it  sends  a  convincing  signal  to  Brazil  and  Mexico to  keep 
paying their debt. 
8.2  The Bolivian Buyback 
The  Bolivian  buyback  must  be  understood  against  the  following 
background.  Bolivia  was  the  only  case  up  to  1988  in  which  the  U.S. 
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position  only  after  long  and  difficult  negotiations  with  the  Bolivian 
government.’  The  strategy  has  been  highly  beneficial  for  all  parties, 
according  to  the  theory  of  the  “debt  overhang”  outlined  earlier.  Bolivia, 
alone of the high-inflation  countries in the Southern Cone, has been able to 
stabilize and to resume growth because it has not been trapped by excessive 
debt repayments. There has also been a restoration of political stability in the 
country  after  the  chaos  and  virtual  anarchy  of  hyperinflation  during 
After  the  Paz  government  came to  power  in  mid-1985  and  undertook 
remarkable stabilization efforts to halt the hyperinflation, it remained official 
U.S. and  IMF policy  in  the  spring  of  1986 that  Bolivia  should  resume 
interest payments on its foreign bank debt. Indeed, in March 1986, only two 
months  after price  stability had been restored to the country, the  IMF was 
urging a large devaluation in Bolivia in order to facilitate increased interest 
payments to the commercial banks. The Bolivian government was convinced 
that such a move, in addition to destroying the economic and political basis 
of  the  stabilization  program  itself,  would  cause  a  collapse  of  the 
government. 
Instead,  the  Bolivian  government  urged  a  different  approach  in  dis- 
cussions  with  the  U.S.  government  and  the  IMF.8 Ultimately,  the  IMF 
agreed to treat the Bolivian case on its own merits and acknowledged  that 
Bolivia’s  foreign  bank  debt  could  not  be  paid  (at  least,  not  without 
undermining  economic  and  political  stability  in  the  country).’  The  IMF 
also agreed to grant Bolivia a program based on its successful stabilization 
efforts, despite the fact that  the Bolivian government  had  not  reached  any 
understanding  with  the commercial  bank  creditors. This was  the  first time 
that the IMF loaned  money  to a debtor country that did not  plan to make 
interest payments  to the commercial banks (or even to clear the arrears on 
back payments). 
In  late  1986, the  banks  began  to  discuss  with  Bolivia  a  longer-term 
solution to Bolivia’s debt overhang, once they saw that the U.S. government 
and the IMF were not going to defend the banks’ position  vis-a-vis Bolivia. 
Moreover,  for  several  years,  the  U.S.  regulators  had  been  forcing 
writedowns of  Bolivian  debt in the banks’  books,  thereby eliminating  any 
important  incentives that the banks  might have had to hold on to the debt. 
After two years of complicated discussions and legal work, the buyback was 
arranged.  Note that during the entire period of discussions,  Bolivia did not 
pay any interest to the commercial banks. At the same time, Bolivia received 
large net resource transfers (on the order of  about 5 percent of  GNP per year) 
from the official creditors. 
As mentioned earlier, Bolivia repurchased with the buyback about one-half 
of  its  debt at  11 cents per  dollar of  face value.  The money  used  for this 
purpose was donated from foreign governments.  While some of the money 
might otherwise have come to Bolivia as foreign aid in other forms, much of 
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it would not  (of the $34 million  spent on the buyback, Bolivia might have 
been able to get $15-20  million of the money in other forms of  aid). 
It  might  appear  that  the  buyback  could  not  have  had  much  of  a 
beneficial  efficiency  effect on Bolivia,  since  the  country  only  repurchased 
one-half  of  the debt and the remainder  still  sells for  11 cents (indicating 
that most of the remaining  debt also will not be paid, thus leaving Bolivia 
in a situation of default). But this abstract analysis misses the real point of 
Bolivia’s  situation  post-buyback.  Under  current  U.S.  and  IMF  policy, 
Bolivia  is  not  being  pressed  on the remaining  part of  the debt, except to 
settle  that  remainder  on a  similar  basis  to  the  buyback.”  In  effect,  the 
official  community is recommending  a  gradual process  in  which  Bolivia 
will clear all of  its commercial bank debts at a price of about  11 percent of 
face  value,  and  the  process  seems  to  be  occurring:  after  the  buyback, 
Bolivia  has  continued  to  repurchase debt  at  the  buyback  price,  through 
individual  deals  with  creditor  banks.  Meanwhile,  as  this  process  goes 
forward,  the  official  community  has  agreed  not  to  impose  sanctions on 
Bolivia for nonpayment  on the remaining bank debt. 
Was the debt strategy of  the IMF and U.S. government successful  in the 
case of  Bolivia?  The  answer  is  a  resounding yes,  for  all  of  the  parties 
concerned. In effect, in 1986 the official community recognized the futility of 
trying  to press  Bolivia  to  pay  unpayable  debt.  As  a  result,  the Bolivian 
government got the time and international support to put in place a remarkably 
strong and effective stabilization program that has ended a hyperinflation and 
restored growth to the country for the first time in almost a decade. Bolivia’s 
political stability has been enhanced, as have its democratic institutions. The 
creditors as a whole benefited as well, as shown by the fact that Bolivia’s debt 
rose in value from 5 to 11 cents per dollar. This increase in the price of  debt 
was not a giveaway by Bolivia. I  It reflects, instead, the creditors’ share of the 
remarkable turnaround of the Bolivian economy, from the worst in the world 
during the early 1980s (with the world’s highest inflation in forty years) to one 
of  stability and incipient recovery  in 1988. 
Bolivia’s success story depended strongly on the supportive actions of the 
U.S. government and the  IMF in providing  a framework in which  Bolivia 
could  successfully  negotiate  with  its bank  creditors. Effective  progress  for 
other  debtor  countries  will  require  similar  oficial  forbearance.  As  the 
Bolivian case has demonstrated, the debtor as well as the creditors (at least 
taken  as a group)  can benefit  strongly  from  a  realistic  approach to com- 
prehensive debt reduction. 
8.3  Bolivia’s Relations with the Official Creditors 
The key  to Bolivia’s  debt strategy  has been  to maintain  good financial 
relations  with  official  creditors  while  at  the  same  time  pursuing  debt 
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to  the IMF, World  Bank,  and Inter-American  Development Bank; negoti- 
ated two standby programs with the IMF for 1986-87  and  1987-88,  and a 
three-year Structural Adjustment Facility with the IMF for 1988-90;  negoti- 
ated  several  loans with  the World  Bank  on concessional  terms  (from the 
International Development Association fund); and renegotiated the debt with 
the Paris Club on highly favorable terms in 1986 and 1988. 
The result  has  been  a positive  net  resource  transfer  from  the  official 
creditor community at the same time that Bolivia has had essentially a zero 
net resource transfer to the banks. The relevant data are shown in table 8.1, 
where we see that after the stabilization program  went into effect  in  1985, 
Bolivia  succeeded  in  reversing  the  overall  net  resource  transfer  by  an 
elimination  of  net  outflows  to  the banks and  a  reversal  from outflows  to 
inflows from the official community. 
Table 8.1  Net Resource Transfers on  Medium- and Long-Term Debt, 1982-87 
($ million) 








Net transfer as % of GNP 
71  14 
56  45 
15  -31 
-  132  -  149 
-7  -  I7 
-  I25  -  I32 
-61  -  135 
2.0  -4.6 
-  53 
1 
-  54 
-  49 
-2 
-  47 
-  102 
-3.4 
-  86  195  81 
-41  142  49 
-  45  54  33 
-  30  -  I1  -9 
-4  -3  -I 
-  26  -8  -8 
-116  I84  72 
-3.6  4.8  1.7 
Source:  World Bank Debt Tables, 1988-89  edition 
9  Beyond Stabilization 
to Economic Growth 
and Development 
The Bolivian  stabilization has eliminated much of the panic conditions that 
surrounded  the hyperinflation  in  1984 and  1985. Also, significant progress 
has been  made  in  easing the  external debt  overhang.  Virtually  complete 
price stability has been reestablished  in Bolivia during 1987 and 1988. It is 
evident, however, that many of  the deeper problems in the Bolivian economy 
and society that helped  to cause the hyperinflation  remain  in place, and in 257  BolividChapter 9 
some cases have  deepened. We  now  mention  some of  the  challenges that 
remain  in converting the current  stabilization  period  into the first phase of 
sustained economic development. 
The end of the hyperinflation did not bring  a sudden rejuvenation  of  the 
economy. Real growth during 1987 and  1988, while positive, was not even 
enough to maintain  real living standards. Indeed, it is fair to say that once 
the  hyperinflation  was  lifted,  Bolivia’s  desperate  underlying  situation 
became even more apparent. 
We  noted  in  the  introduction  that  Bolivia  has survived  for hundreds  of 
years  on  the  exports  of  a  few  commodities:  silver  until  the  nineteenth 
century,  tin during the twentieth  century,  and natural  gas and  (illicit) coca 
paste  in the  1980s. None  of  these  commodities can continue to act  as the 
engine of  growth  of  the Bolivian  economy.  Silver and  tin  deposits  have 
been heavily mined, and remaining  exploitation  of these minerals  will have 
to  be  on  a  smaller  and  much  more  technologically  advanced  basis.  Tin 
mining  in  Bolivia  had  already  become  unprofitable  at  $5.60 per  pound, 
the  price  that  prevailed  before  the  collapse  of  the  world  tin  market  in 
October  1985.  At  the  post-collapse  price  of  about  $3.00 per  pound,  the 
Bolivian  government was  forced  to  lay  off  most  of  the  tin  miners,  and 
Bolivia  now  stands little chance of  maintaining  significant  amounts of  tin 
exports. 
Natural gas is almost as problematical.  The price on Bolivia’s natural gas 
exports to Argentina was slashed sharply after the collapse of world petroleum 
prices in early 1986. What is more, Bolivia’s export contract with Argentina 
expires in 1992. In view of Argentina’s recent large discoveries of natural gas 
deposits,  it  is  quite  possible  that  the  gas  contract  with  Bolivia  will  be 
suspended after 1992 or at least renegotiated on a much smaller scale. 
Coca paste  is the most  problematical  and  ironical  case of  all. As  men- 
tioned  in  chapter  1,  starting in  the  early  1980s, when  U.S. demand for 
cocaine soared, Bolivia  was pulled  into the  extensive cultivation  of  coca 
leaf, the raw material input of  cocaine. The coca leaf is processed into coca 
paste, a precursor of pure cocaine, and is then smuggled to Colombia. In the 
mid-l980s,  it  was  estimated  by  the  U.S. Drug  Enforcement  Authority 
(DEA) that Bolivian foreign earnings on coca paste exports roughly matched 
the sum total of  all legal Bolivian exports. 
Bolivia  has  demonstrated  a  natural  comparative  advantage  in  coca 
cultivation.  The climate of  the Yungas and Chapare regions  of the country 
are well  suited to coca cultivation, and coca leaf  has played  an important 
role  in  the  Andean  culture for centuries. Illegal  narcotics  traffickers  have 
demonstrated  an enormous entrepreneurial  activity  in  mobilizing  resources 
into the sector, developing transportation and communications lines, etc. 
And yet, of  course, the industry has been a disaster for the country from 
almost all points of view.  It has encouraged the development of  an internal 
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poses  life-and-death  risks  for  Bolivia’s  democratic  institutions  and  civil 
society. Coca cultivation has jeopardized Bolivia’s foreign relations with the 
United  States  and  other  industrialized  countries.  It  has  thereby  created 
enormous uncertainties, as the U.S. government has repeatedly threatened to 
suspend foreign aid and international support to Bolivia. 
Coca production has also drained economic vitality from other economic 
sectors B la the “Dutch disease.”2 It has debilitated the tax system, since a 
“leading  sector”  is  outside  of  normal  tax  c~llection.~  Hundreds  of 
thousands of  well-organized (and in many cases well-armed) peasants now 
derive their meager  livelihood from the  cultivation of  coca leaf,  meaning 
that  any  plan  for  limiting  coca  cultivation  must  confront  an  enormous 
political  and  economic  challenge  from  a  large  part  of  the  population. 
Despite all of  this,  the Bolivian government has devoted a large share of 
its  scarce resources and  political capital to  reducing coca cultivation and 
trafficking. 
For these reasons, Bolivia must now develop a new export base, indeed a 
completely new economic orientation, one that is a radical departure from its 
entire past history. As the planning minister, Gonzalo Sanchez de Losada, has 
said many times,  “Bolivia  must  reinvent  itself.”  The basic  strategy is to 
follow  the  lead  of  the  outward-oriented  developing  countries:  make  the 
environment fertile for new exports, and then wait to see which industries 
respond  to the  incentives. Few  observers could foresee that  Chile’s  brisk 
growth in recent years would be based on kiwi exports or that Korea’s export 
surge in the  1960s would be  initiated with the export of  wigs to the U.S. 
market! The key policies for promoting the new export base in Bolivia are a 
realistic exchange rate,  an open trading system, and-budget  permitting- 
fiscal incentives for nontraditional exports. Bolivian export potential seems to 
be greatest in three broad areas. First, there is obvious potential in agricultural 
exports. The Bolivian lowlands in the East offer a vast and fertile area for 
grains (e.g.,  soybeans), tropical fruits, cut flowers, timber, etc. Bolivia has 
already begun to make soybean exports to world markets since the mid-1980s. 
Second, there is the potential for light manufacturing (e.g., yarns,  textiles, 
furniture), especially for export to the Brazilian market. In July 1988, Brazil 
and Bolivia signed a new trade accord to open up some of the Brazilian market 
to new Bolivian goods. Third, there is the remaining potential in the mining 
and petroleum sectors. With new technologies for secondary recovery, some 
old  silver and  tin  mines  might once  again become  profitable. There also 
remains the potential,  long under discussion,  for a natural gas pipeline to 
Brazil. 
All  of  these new  industries will require time,  learning, and, above all, 
heavy investment expenditure. In turn,  the investments must be predicated 
on a long period of  social peace and political stability. Whether that stability 
can be achieved is certainly Bolivia’s most important question. There remain 259  BolividChapter 9 
three sociopolitical cleavages that are serious obstacles to economic stability 
and long-term growth: income distribution, ideology, and region. 
The income distributional cleavage remains profound and is the source of 
considerable political conflict. The key political problem is to moderate the 
nearly continuous confrontation between  powerful  social groups, such  as 
organized labor and  private capital, and  the  various regional forces. The 
state-capitalism model attempted to finesse the income distribution problem 
through  a combination  of  the  inflation tax,  heavy  foreign  borrowing, or 
internal  repression  of  the  lower  classes.  None  of  these  alternatives is 
workable for a long-term development strategy. 
A  key  to  a  more  equitable  distribution  of  income  in  Bolivia  is  an 
increased  tax  burden  on  the  higher  income  individuals.  Rather  than 
balancing the budget by  eliminating the basic services of  the state, such as 
health and education, considerations of  equity and stability require that the 
government make increased efforts to secure an adequate tax base on the 
higher incomes. This might include a tax on land holdings and higher taxes 
on  luxury consumption goods.  A  second key  to  a  more equitable distri- 
bution  of  income  would  be  greater  public  spending  on  education  in  the 
rural  sector, where most  of  Bolivia’s poorest citizens live.  Investment in 
the  human  capital of  the  rural  peasantry  is  essential  for  long-term  eco- 
nomic development. 
The  second  division  to  overcome  is  ideological,  involving  competing 
conceptions of  the role of  government. With the evident failures of  state 
capitalism in the past two decades, there is a temptation on one side for a 
strict laissez-faire economic approach and, on the other side, for a fortified 
socialism. A more modulated approach is more likely to succeed. Such an 
approach would recognize the government’s responsibilities for infrastruc- 
ture and social investments in health and education, but also recognize the 
limitations to the role of  the state in the productive sector. Part of  the push 
toward laissez faire in  Bolivia is  a frank acknowledgement of  the limited 
capacity for honest, capable public administration in the country. But this 
limitation could be lessened by  a concerted effort to raise the standards and 
capacity of  the state bureaucracy. A determined effort at improved training 
of civil servants is vital in this regard. 
The third  division  is  sectoral and  regional. As  we  have  noted,  export 
diversification will  require  a change in  emphasis to  agriculture and  light 
manufacturing, which in turn will surely entail some geographical shift in 
the locus of economic activity from the highlands to the lowlands. This kind 
of  shift  can  be  politically  bruising  and  destructive if  not  handled  with 
foresight and planning. The government will have to tread carefully between 
goals of  allocating investment expenditures heavily toward the new  sectors 
and regions, and the need to distribute the burdens and benefits of  public 
spending in an equitable manner. 